Three lost weeks in February
I
have been reading the Wall Street Journal most of my adult life, and my
experience until this year was quite consistent: While I disagreed
substantially with a lot of the content on the editorial pages, I found the
news content to be unbiased, relevant and always well written. However, since
the onset of the pandemic, I have found myself reading very few of the news
stories, since they seemed to be mostly ignoring what’s without a doubt the
most important story so far in the 21st century: the pandemic, and
this country’s disastrous response to it. Since the editorial page has from the
beginning downplayed the pandemic’s importance as well as the importance of
doing anything about it, it seemed the message had reached the reporters: They
should find other things to write about.
So
I was pleasantly surprised when they ran a story yesterday called “Three Lost
Weeks Stalled Virus Testing” (the link is here, although it’s probably behind a paywall. If you’d like
to read it and you’re not a subscriber, you could sign up for the free trial). The
story describes the 21 days between Feb. 8, when the CDC realized there was a
problem with the test they’d developed and shipped to labs across the country,
and Feb. 29, when they offered a broad solution that didn’t require shipping
out new test kits – just using the original kit in a different way (a solution
they could have offered right from the start, but for some reason were
reluctant to do). During that time, all testing swabs had to be sent to the CDC
in Atlanta to be processed, which greatly limited the number of tests that
could be performed per day.
Meanwhile,
the US could have easily bought any quantity it wanted of the German test that
was endorsed by the WHO, and which was used in lots of other countries quite
successfully. But it seems nobody even thought of that.
Why
was this delay important? The story points out that the virus probably started
spreading person-to-person in the US in January. Since during the entire month
of February tests were severely limited (and they remain limited to this day,
of course, relative to the size of the epidemic in the US), they had to be
limited to people who had traveled recently to China. Anybody who didn’t meet
that criterion couldn’t be tested, period. So the message was loud and clear: The
only people who have to worry about the novel coronavirus are those who’ve been
in China. After all, 100% of the cases we’ve identified so far are people who
had traveled to China! Nobody else needs to worry.
So
people felt free to travel freely and gather in large groups in February, when
they should have been warned to stop those activities (as other countries had
done. Remember, Italy had banned all travel within and without the country).
And the article notes that probably the biggest superspreader event of February
was Mardi Gras in New Orleans, where a million people gathered to celebrate. Of
course, Louisiana paid the price big time, but this probably seeded outbreaks
in other states as well.
Also,
had testing been freely available in February, New York City might have
recognized what a serious problem it faced. The NYC infection was seeded by travelers
from Europe, perhaps even before travelers from China seeded outbreaks in
Seattle and the Bay Area – but of course travelers from Europe weren’t tested. And
other states, wanting to avoid New York’s dilemma, might have banned travel
from that city, just as NYC is now requiring quarantines of travelers from
almost all other states (and there’s a good reason for that. NYC’s test
positivity rate is now around .25%, vs. 6.3% nationally and 15.5% in Texas).
Of
course, the people responsible for bungling testing at the CDC were trying to
do a good job. But there was nobody pounding on the table in early February,
saying to the CDC “Look this is really serious! Buy the WHO test now! If you
fix the problem with your test tomorrow, maybe we’ll have wasted some money.
But the stakes are way too high not to do something.” Who could have done this?
Lots of people, including Dr. Fauci (who only reluctantly admitted in late
February that “perhaps” this could have been handled differently), Alex Azar or
President Trump himself. But none of them did anything, because Trump was
making it very clear that he would allow no talk about an epidemic in the US. He
had solved the problem with his total ban on travelers from China (which was
great except for the 40,000 people who entered the US from China after the
ban).
Had
this been done, and had Trump just handed the pandemic response over to the
experts in March rather than trying to play Donnie, Boy Epidemiologist, we
would probably be like Germany or even France now – struggling to suppress new
outbreaks, but with the novel coronavirus under control on a national scale,
rather than just in a few places like New York City.
The numbers
These numbers are updated
every day, based on reported US Covid-19 deaths the day before (taken from the
Worldometers.info site, where I’ve been getting my numbers all along). No other
variables go into the projected numbers – they are all projections based on
yesterday’s 7-day rate of increase in total Covid-19 deaths, which was 4%.
Note that the “accuracy”
of the projected numbers diminishes greatly after 3-4 weeks. This is because,
up until 3-4 weeks, deaths could in theory be predicted very accurately, if one
knew the real number of cases. In other words, the people who are going to die in
the next 3-4 weeks of Covid-19 are already sick with the disease, even though
they may not know it yet. But this means that the trend in deaths should be
some indicator of the level of infection 3-4 weeks previous.
However, once we get
beyond 3-4 weeks, deaths become more and more dependent on policies and
practices that are put in place – or removed, as is more the case nowadays -
after today (as well as other factors like the widespread availability of an
effective treatment, if not a real “cure”). Yet I still think there’s value in
just trending out the current rate of increase in deaths, since it gives some
indication of what will happen in the near term if there are no significant
intervening changes.
Week
ending
|
Deaths
reported during week/month
|
Avg.
deaths per day during week/month
|
Deaths as
percentage of previous month’s
|
March 7
|
18
|
3
|
|
March 14
|
38
|
5
|
|
March 21
|
244
|
35
|
|
March 28
|
1,928
|
275
|
|
Month of
March
|
4,058
|
131
|
|
April 4
|
6,225
|
889
|
|
April 11
|
12,126
|
1,732
|
|
April 18
|
18,434
|
2,633
|
|
April 25
|
15,251
|
2,179
|
|
Month of
April
|
59,812
|
1,994
|
1,474%
|
May 2
|
13,183
|
1,883
|
|
May 9
|
12,592
|
1,799
|
|
May 16
|
10,073
|
1,439
|
|
May 23
|
8,570
|
1,224
|
|
May 30
|
6,874
|
982
|
|
Month of
May
|
42,327
|
1,365
|
71%
|
June 6
|
6,544
|
935
|
|
June 13
|
5,427
|
775
|
|
June 20
|
4,457
|
637
|
|
June 27
|
6,167
|
881
|
|
Month of
June
|
23,925
|
798
|
57%
|
July 4
|
4,166
|
595
|
|
July 11
|
5,087
|
727
|
|
July 18
|
5,476
|
782
|
|
July 25
|
6,971
|
996
|
|
Month of July
|
26,649
|
860
|
111%
|
August 1
|
8,069
|
1,153
|
|
August 8
|
7,153
|
1,022
|
|
August 15
|
7,556
|
1,079
|
|
August 22
|
7,107
|
1,015
|
|
August 29
|
7,399
|
1,057
|
|
Month of August
|
31,602
|
1,019
|
119%
|
September
5
|
7,704
|
1,101
|
|
September
12
|
8,021
|
1,146
|
|
September
19
|
8,351
|
1,193
|
|
September
26
|
8,695
|
1,242
|
|
Month
of Sept.
|
34,861
|
1,162
|
110%
|
Total
March – September
|
223,235
|
|
|
Red = projected
numbers
I. Total deaths
Total US deaths as of
yesterday: 177,438
Deaths reported yesterday:
1,073
Yesterday’s 7-day rate of
increase in total deaths: 4% (This number is used to project deaths in the table
above; it was 4% two days ago. There is a 7-day cycle in the reported deaths
numbers, caused by lack of reporting over the weekends from closed state
offices. So this is the only reliable indicator of a trend in deaths, not the three-day
percent increase I used to focus on, and certainly not the one-day percent
increase, which mainly reflects where we are in the 7-day cycle).
II. Total reported cases
Total US reported cases: 5,746,534
Increase in reported cases
since previous day: 45,144
Percent increase in reported
cases since 7 days previous: 6%
III. Deaths as a percentage of closed cases so far in the US:
Total Recoveries in US as
of yesterday: 3,095,910
Total Deaths as of yesterday:
177,438
Deaths so far as
percentage of closed cases (=deaths + recoveries): 5%
For a discussion of what this number means – and why
it’s so important – see this post. Short
answer: If this percentage declines, that’s good. It’s been steadily declining since
a high of 41% at the end of March. But a good number would be 2%, like South
Korea’s. An OK number would be 4%, like China’s.
IV. 7-day average of
test positive rate for US: 6.3%
For
comparison, the recent peak for this rate was 27% in late July, although the peak
in late March was 75%. This is published by Johns Hopkins.
I
would love to hear any comments or questions you have on this post. Drop me an
email at tom@tomalrich.com
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